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THE MADRID PROTOCOL: A VOLUNTARY
MODEL FOR THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF TRADEMARK LAW
Peter Wilner*
In April of 1996, the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks ("Protocol")
went into effect.' The Protocol, which is administered by the
International Bureau ("Bureau") of the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"), augments a framework for the
international registration of trademarks initially created by the
Madrid Agreement ("Agreement").2 In September of 2002, the
United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 2215.' Title
XII of that bill contains the legislation implementing the Protocol
into U.S. Trademark law ("The Lanham Act").' The Senate passed
H.R. 2215 and adopted the advice and consent resolution regarding

. Mr. Wilner is a Research Associate with Masur & Associates, which works
with business in media, entertainment and technology industries. He interned
with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) where he researched
and wrote about The Madrid Protocol. He also served as the Symposium Editor
for the Cardozo Journal of Internationaland ComparativeLaw. J.D., Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law, 2002; B.A., Cornell University, 1998. The author
wishes to thank Professor Peter Yu, Paul Salmon and Eleanor Meltzer of the
USPTO, Orobola Fasehun of WIPO, April Tate, and his mother, Arlene Wilner.
1. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989, WIPO Document WOO 16EN [hereinafter
Protocol], availableat www.wipo.int; See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act
and Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act. Hearings on H.R. 567 Before
the Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 105' h Cong. (1997).
2. See The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, April 14, 1891, WIPO Document WOO I5EN [hereinafter "Agreement"],
availableat www.wipo.int; see discussion in Parts I and II, infra.
3. See Conference Report on H.R. 2215, 21 s' Department of Justice
AppropriationsAuthorization Act - (House of Representatives - September 26,
2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
4. See H.R. 2215, 21" Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passedby Both House and Senate),
availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
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the Protocol in October of 2002.' In November of 2002, H.R. 2215
became Public Law No: 107-273.6
As a participant in the Protocol's framework, the U.S. can
provide its trademark owners with access to international
protection via a framework that leaves its domestic system of
registration and protection virtually unaltered.7 This is because the
Protocol is designed to allow the states party to it ("Contracting
Parties") to participate in that framework without substantially
modifying their own systems. By allowing different systems to
coexist within the same international administrative framework,8
the Protocol
serves as a voluntary model
for the

internationalization of trademark law.9
U.S. accession to the Protocol came only after two primary
obstacles were overcome.1" The first was the "Havana Club"
controversy, in which Havana Club Holdings ("HCH") (a joint
venture between the Cuban government and a French distributor of
wines and spirits) had sought to enjoin Bacardi, a U.S. distributor,

5. See 21s" Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act
- Conference Report (Senate - October 03, 2002); Protocol Relating to the
Madrid Agreement - Treaty Document No. 106-41 (Senate - October 17, 2002),
availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
6. See Bill Summary and Status for the 10 7th Congress, H.R. 2215, available
at http://thomas.loc.gov.
7. See 15 USC §§ 1141e-h; see discussion in Part IV, infra.
8. See discussion in Parts IV and V, infra.
9. "Internationalization," as applicable to trademark law, can be defined as
the construction of relationships between inconsistent systems whereby owners
from around the world can gain approximately equal protection in international
markets. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Harmonization:Norms, Names &
Nonsense, 2 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 33, 47-48. This can be contrasted with
harmonization, which describes a process by which different sets of laws are
made to closely (if not completely) resemble one another. The goal is to create a
legal atmosphere where individuals, corporations, and governments can act on a
level playing field. See James E. Crawford, The Harmonization of Law and
Mexican Antitrust: Cooperation or Resistance?, 4 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 407,
411. I call the model "voluntary" because the Protocol allows the Contracting
Parties to alter their domestic legislation as they see fit. See discussion in Parts
IV and V, infra.
10. See Madrid Protocol Timeline in U.S., available at www.inta.org.
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from using the name "Havana Club" for its rum." In the United
States, both the District Court for the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found against
HCH. 12 HCH vowed to appeal to the Supreme Court. 3 At the
international level, however, the Appellate Body of the World
Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body found that the
legislation upon which the U.S. courts' decisions are based is
largely inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement.' 4 Meanwhile, the
full House, and the Senate Judiciary and Foreign Relations
Committees passed legislation implementing the Protocol in 2001
(before the Appellate Body issued its decision). However, the full
Senate continued to postpone action on the legislation. 5 However,
despite the impact of the "Havana Club" controversy, 6 it was
11. For a full discussion of the "Havana Club" story, see Misha Gregory
McCaw, The New Rum War: Havana Club as a Threat to U.S. Interest in the
International Trademark Organization, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 291 (2000); Maria
Guerra, The Rocky Road of the U.S. Accession to the Madrid Protocol: Could
This Be The Year?, II J.Art & Ent. Law 525 ; Also see Report of the Appellate
Body, United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998,
WT/DS 176/AB/R, availableat www.wto.org.
12. The "Havana Club" litigation in the U.S. consists of five separate
proceedings: Havana Club Holding S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
13. See McCaw, supra note 11, at 310.
14. See WTO decision, supra note 11.
15. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the implementing legislation
in July of 2001. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
legislation in November of 2001. See "PTO Chief Hopes Congress Will Wrap
Up Madrid Protocol Ratification, Implementation," supra note 3; The Appellate
Body's decision was rendered on January 2, 2002. See WTO decision, supra
note 4; Legislation implementing the Protocol passed the House on March 14,
2001.Senator Patrick Leahy reintroduced the legislation on June 14 2002. See
The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, June 14, 2002, (remarks of Senator
Patrick Leahy), supra note 3.
16. Senator Jesse Helms, a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, had opposed the legislation in the past because of "Havana Club".
See Guerra, supra at note 4. However, HCH and Bacardi had reportedly reached
"an agreement regarding the treaty that [would] not affect the implementing
legislation." See Statement of Orrin G. Hatch Before the Senate Judiciary
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ultimately overshadowed by the overwhelming support for the
Protocol in both the U.S. government and the business
community. 17
A second obstacle to U.S. accession was a provision in Article
14 of the Protocol, which permits intergovernmental organizations
(such as the Council of the European Union) to join the Protocol as
Contracting Organizations"S and to exercise a vote distinct from
those of its member nations that are themselves Contracting
Parties. 9 This issue was ultimately resolved: where a vote is
called for, the EU agreed to conduct consultations with the U.S.
and to not allow the number of votes cast by the European
Community to exceed the number of members in the
Community.2" The fact that this issue hindered U.S. accession to
the Protocol for so long2 emphasizes the U.S.'s desire to
participate in a system of international trademark protection that

Committee Executive Business Meeting on the Markup of S.407 - The Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act, Thursday, July 19, 2001, available at

http://hatch.senate.gov/pressapp.
17. See discussion in Part II, infra. See Washington Update, Number
Eighteen, April 2002, in which INTA published a list of large corporations who
have written to their senators in support of the Protocol (the list includes Kodak,
Proctor & Gamble, Bayer, Compaq and DuPont), availableat www.inta.org.
18. Article 14(l)(b) of the Protocol states:
any intergovernmental organization may also become a party to this protocol
where the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i)
at least one of the member states is a party to the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property;
(ii)
that organization has a regional office for the purposes of
registering marks with effect in the territory of the organization;
Article 1 states that these members shall be given the same status as states who
are members of the Protocol. This status includes, among other things, the
ability to vote on amendments to the Protocol.
19. See H.R. No. 107-19 (2001), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
20. Id.; See Consideration of Pending Treaties, Hearing Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 10 6 th Cong., Second
Session (Wednesday, Sept 13 th , 2000), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
21. Implementing legislation was first introduced in the 102nd Congresses;
see Guerra, supra note 4; see Madrid Protocol Timeline in U.S., available at
www.inta.org.
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22
respects a Contracting Party's rights as a sovereign entity.
The Protocol creates that system by observing two fundament
principles of international law: first, it obligates a Contracting
Party only to that which it consents to be obligated to.23 The
Madrid system accomplishes this via the creation of a Union in
which each member gets one vote in the Union's decisions
("Madrid Union"). 24 Dilution of that vote (by, for instance,
effectively giving another member two votes, as would happen if
the EU were to vote independently of its member states) would
render a member's consent or objection to any subsequent changes
to the Protocol less meaningful, thereby compromising its standing
as a member of the Madrid Union. In turn, this would decrease its
ability to determine the rules to which it was subject and,
The
consequently, would compromise its sovereignty.
arrangement between the EU and the U.S. ensures that this dilution
will not occur and that every Party's voice will carry equal weight
in the Madrid Union's voting system.25
Second (and more importantly for the purposes of this article),
the Protocol leaves substantially intact each member state's
exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory and the permanent
population living there.26 It accomplishes this by accommodating
the fundamental differences between the common law and civil
law systems of trademark registration and allowing each
Contracting Party to substantially maintain its own legal
framework.2 7 By this, the Protocol ensures that sovereign states

22. See Records of the Diplomatic Conferencefor the Inclusion of a Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the InternationalRegistration of
Marks, Madrid, 1989 [hereinafter Madrid Conference], WIPO PUBLICATION
NO. 345(E); see discussion infra Part II.
23. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 287-88 (4 h ed.,
1990).
24. See Protocol, supra note 1, at Article 10; see Agreement, supra note 2, at
Article 10.
25. See HearingStatement on the Madrid ProtocolImplementation Act at the
2002,
19,
July
Judiciarv
Committee,
Senate
http://leahy.senate.gov./press/200107/010719.html (July 19, 2001).
26. See Brownlie, supra note 23.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
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will retain substantial control over their territories via control over
the laws used to govern them.
One author argues that the Protocol disproportionately, and
unnecessarily, favors the Country of Origin's system of
protection,28 thereby infringing on the systems of the other
Contracting Parties.29 This, however, is not the case: a look at the
general civil law model of trademark protection, the American
common law system, and the way that they operate under the
Protocol shows that the Protocol infringes on a Contracting Party's
system only to the minimal extent necessary to create an efficient
international administrative system. Thus, it leaves that system, as
well as a Contracting Party's sovereignty, substantially intact.3"
The U.S., the other member states, and the effort to create truly
global trademark protection benefit from this framework.
Part I of this article will examine the Protocol's text and look at
several arguments that advocated the U.S.'s accession to it. Part II
will look at various political discussions surrounding the Protocol
to show that different bodies, while they had different immediate
concerns, shared the desire for an efficient administrative system
that could accommodate different legal regimes, and the belief that
the Protocol creates that system. Part HI will look at various
arguments that were made against U.S. accession to the Protocol.
Part IV will examine the general civil law and American common
law registration systems and the way they operate under the
Protocol in order to show that the Protocol leaves both systems
substantially unaltered. This article will then look at H.R. 1125 to
show the Protocol's minor effect on, and compatibility with, U.S.
trademark law. Part V will argue that the Protocol represents a
"voluntary" model for the internationalization of trademark law.
Part VI will recommend that WIPO, the Contracting Parties, and
28. The Country of Origin is the country from which the basic application or
registration originates. The examining office of that country is the Office of
Origin. See discussion infra Part IVC.
29. See Carlo Cotrone, The United States and the Madrid Protocol A Time
to Decline, A Time to Accede, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 75 (2000); see
discussion infra Part 1II.
30. See discussion infra Part IV.
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those not yet party to the Protocol, continue studying the
interaction of the Protocol and various domestic registration
systems in order to improve that model.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR ACCESSION TO THE PROTOCOL

Several commentators point out the significant advantages that
will accrue to businesses because of U.S. accession to the Protocol,
which provides a means of entry into the Madrid Union. This
Union was formerly closed to those that had not acceded to the
Agreement. 1 Originally signed in 1891, the Agreement was
designed to allow a holder of a registration in one country ("basic
registration") to seek registration in as many other members of the
Union as the registrant chose to designate in his international
application (which becomes an international registration upon
acceptance by the International Bureau of Intellectual Property).3 2
Crucially, it requires that a mark be registered in the country of
origin before the proprietor of that mark applies for international
registration.3 3 Also, applications to the International Bureau must
be submitted in French.34 Each designated country has one year to
examine those applications and to extend or refuse protection for
marks contained therein.35 Most importantly, an owner whose
mark is the victim of a "central attack," (the basic registration is
cancelled due to a successful opposition before a five-year period

31. See Barbara E. Cookson, How the Madrid Protocol Works, 654 PLI/Pat
161, 169 (2001).
32. See Agreement, supra note 2. Article 1(2) of the Agreement states:
Nationals of any of the contracting countries party to this Agreement, secure
protection for their marks applicable to goods and services, registered in the
country of origin, by filing the said marks at the International Bureau of
Intellectual Property (emphasis added).
33. See Id.
34. See Common Regulations Under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks and the Protocol Relating to that Agreement,
Rule 6(2)(a).
WIPO Doc. WO017EN [hereinafter Protocol Regulations],
available at www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legaltexts/pdfcommon=regualtions.pdf.
35. See supra note 2, art. 5(5).

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

7

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAUL J. ART. &ENT. LAW

[Vol. XIB: 17

elapses) will have his international registration cancelled as well.36
These features of the Agreement proved to be bars to U.S.
accession. The requirement of a national registration as the basis
of an international registration means that applicants from
countries that have a pre-registration use requirement and a long
examination process are at a significant disadvantage as compared
to those from countries that have neither because the latter group
will obtain registrations more quickly.37 The requirement that a
basic registration be in French exacerbates this disadvantage as
international applicants from non-French-speaking countries (such
as the U.S.) need to invest time and money in order to have their
national registrations translated."
The requirement that national offices examine applications
within one year was also seen as incompatible with U.S. practice
as, while the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office might complete its
examination in one year, the PTO allows third parties to oppose
registration of the mark before that registration is granted. This
opposition procedure differs substantially from that in civil law
countries and requires that more time be allotted for examination.39
Finally, the Agreement, by making international protection
completely dependent on the viability of the basic registration for
the first five years of its existence, provides registrants in civil law
countries with an advantage over American applicants as it is
easier to both register a mark and maintain that registration in a
civil law jurisdiction.4"
The Protocol, with its more flexible administrative framework,
removes these bars to accession. First, an international registration
may be based on a national application or a national registration.4'
This means that applicants from countries which grant registration
36. See Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6(3);Thorsten Klein, Madrid
Trademark Agreement vs. Madrid Protocol, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES,
484, 487 (2001).
37. See discussion infra Part IV.
38. See Cotrone, supra note 29, at 82.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
40. Id.
41. Protocol, Article 2(I)(i); see Cookson, supra note 31, at 173.
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without evidence of use no longer enjoy such a pronounced
advantage over those from countries which do require such
evidence.42
Second, that national application or registration
("basic application" or "basic registration") can be in English or
French. This means that American applicants will not have to
spend extra time or money to translate their basic application or
registration before applying for international protection.43
Third, Article 5(2)(b) of the Protocol allows a Contracting Party
to extend the examination period from one year to eighteen months
and to grant oppositions to the mark after that period has expired,
thereby accommodating countries (such as the U.S.) with more
substantive examination processes.'
Fourth, the Protocol
significantly modifies the central attack provision of the
Agreement: Article 9quinques of the Protocol allows a trademark
proprietor, whose international registration has been cancelled due
to a successful opposition to, or withdrawal of, the basic
application or the revocation, cancellation or invalidation of the
basic registration,45 to file directly with the national offices of any
of the Contracting Parties that were designated in the international
registration and, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled, to
claim the date that the international registration was filed as the
priority date for the national applications.46

42. See discussion infra, Part IV D.
43. See Protocol Regulations, supra note 34, at Rule 6(l)(b).

44. That Article also requires that a country wishing to extend its
examination period must declare that it will do so in implementing legislation.
§ 1141h(c) of the legislation that implements the Protocol in to U.S. law does
this.
45. Article 6(3) of the Protocol lists the conditions under which the country
of origin may request the cancellation of an international registration.
Essentially, the international registration will be cancelled if the basic
application or registration ceases to exist for any reason.
46. Article 9quinquies states that the individual national applications will

only enjoy that date of priority if:
(i)
such application is filed within three months from the date on
which the international registration was cancelled
(ii)
the goods and services listed in the application are in fact covered
by the list of goods and services contained in the international
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The Protocol provides the international applicant with a number
of additional advantages. For example, international registration
has substantially the same effect in the designated countries as
would a registration obtained from those countries' national
offices.47 Consequently, there is a significant reduction in cost to
the applicant, as he no longer has to apply to each country
separately to gain protection in each jurisdiction. 8 The applicant
also saves time as there is a central location for filing documentsthey must file with their national examiner, who will forward the
international application to the Bureau who, in turn, will forward
the application to the Designated Parties' national offices.49
There are potential disadvantages under the Protocol. For
example, the scope of protection provided by the international
registration is limited, for the first five years of its existence, to the
protection provided by the basic registrations or application upon
which that international registration is based.5" For an applicant
from the U.S., this means that even if a foreign country provides
that a mark may be registered for broad classes of goods (as do
many civil law countries), the applicant will be limited to U.S.
classifications, which are generally narrower."
Further, even though Article 3(1) of the Protocol provides that
an international registration may be based on a basic registration or
application, it does not (indeed it cannot) compensate for the fact
that a U.S. applicant may still have his international registration

(iii)

registration in respect of the Contracting Party concerned, and
such application complies with all the applicable requirements of
the applicable law, including the requirements concerning fees.

47. Helen Hill Minsker, Update on the MadridProtocol: Are We There Yet?,
670 PLI/Pat 465 (2001).

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Terril Lewis, Towards Implementation of the Madrid Protocolin the
United States, 89 TMR 918, 929 (1999). After the five-year dependence period

has expired, each Contracting Party may extend a mark as much protection as it
sees fit; Author's e-mail exchange with USPTO (on file with author); see
discussion in Parts III and IV, infra.

51. See Cotrone, supra at note 29, at 87. Again, this limitation only applies
to the five-year dependence period.
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revoked if he fails to obtain a national registration, which as noted
above, is more of a danger under U.S. law than in civil law
jurisdictions. If he does fail to obtain a registration, it will be
significantly more difficult and expensive for the registrant to
obtain international protection, as he will now have to file with
individual national offices. 2 However, as is evidenced below,
these seeming inequities are necessary ingredients in the
Protocol's compromise between international administrative
efficiency and national sovereignty.
II. THE PROTOCOL AND THE COMPROMISE SOUGHT

Three of the four issues discussed above were also the most
widely debated during the Diplomatic Conference regarding the
Protocol ("Diplomatic Conference"), which took place in 1989 in
Madrid, Spain. 3 Much of the debate surrounded Article 5, which,
as noted above, governs how long a country may take to examine a
mark before granting or refusing a registration. Particularly
controversial was Article 5(2)(c), which states that any party who
has declared in its instrument of ratification 54 that it is extending its
examination period to eighteen months (as permitted by Article
5(2)(b)) may also specify in that same declaration that, when a
refusal of protection may result from an opposition, the office of
the Contracting Party may notify the International Bureau of that
refusal after the eighteen month period expires as long as: (i) it
has, before the expiry of the 18-month time limit, informed the
International Bureau of the possibility that oppositions may be
filed after the expiry of the 18-month time limit, and (ii) the
notification of the refusal based on an opposition is made within a
time limit of not more than seven months from the date on which
the opposition period begins; if the opposition period expires
before the time limit of seven months, the notification must be
made within a time limit of one month from the expiry of the

52. See Cotrone, supra note 29, at 86.
53. See Diplomatic Conference, supra note 22.
54. Id. at paragraph 360.
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opposition period.
The Swiss delegation felt that eighteen months was a sufficient
amount of time for an office to complete its examination procedure
and that paragraph (2)(c) constituted an undefined extension of the
period of time that an applicant would have to wait in order to find
out the extent of the protection his mark would be given.5 This
defeated the main purpose of the Protocol, which was to
harmonize to the greatest extent possible the trademark systems of
the Contracting Parties by, among other things, providing defined
time limits for examination periods. 6 France and the German
Democratic Republic supported the Swiss position. 7
But the delegations from the Federal Republic of Germany and
Austria pointed out that the Protocol was also intended as a vehicle
for expanding the size of the Madrid Union. To achieve this
expansion, the Conference would have to take into account the
legal systems in the countries that have not joined. 8 Article 5(2)
sets up a 3-tier system of examination for this purpose:
subparagraph (a) maintains the 12-month examination period of
the Agreement. Subparagraph (b) allows this period to be replaced
by an eighteen-month period. Subparagraph (c) provides a more
flexible period, which can be utilized by those countries, such as
the U.S., which have an opposition system.59
The delegate from England (a common law country and
Protocol member since 1995)6" emphasized the particular need for

this provision: he stated that in his country, firms relied on the
office's substantive examination before considering an
opposition.61 This practice required that there be a sufficient
amount of time for the office to adequately examine the mark and
for oppositions to subsequently be brought. Ultimately the Swiss
delegation, in light of the majority of the other delegations' desire
55. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at paragraphs 364 -365.
Id. at paragraphs 375-78.
Id. at paragraph 823 (Statement of the European Communities).
See Membership list for the Madrid Union, available at www.wipo.int.
See Diplomatic Conference, supra note 22, at paragraph 849.
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for compromise, withdrew its proposition and gave its support to
the text currently contained in paragraph 2(c). 62
Another highly debated provision was Article 6(3), which
essentially provides that the invalidation of the basic application or
registration within five years of the date of the international
registration's issuance will cause the international registration's
cancellation.
The first issue was the clarification of what
situations could lead to the cancellation of the international
registration before the five-year period of dependency had expired.
The delegation from Spain suggested that Article 6(3), instead of
listing all of the situations by which the international registration
would cease to have effect, could have one sentence summarizing
all of those situations, as is done in the Agreement. Such a
sentence might state that the international registration would be
cancelled "[if] the juridical effects of the basic application or basic
registration [ceased]. 63 The delegation from the Federal Republic
of Germany noted that this broad language did not properly
provide for the situation where a national application was still
pending after the expiration of the five-year period, as one could
not know, by that language, whether a still-pending application
would cease to have legal effect or would never have had legal
effect at all. If the latter were the case, canceling the international
registration would undermine the Protocol's system.'
It noted that the system was designed to cover three situations
and those situations needed to be clearly distinguished: (1) where
the national office decided on the application after five years of the
international registration's existence, the international registration
would not be affected by any adverse decision regarding the
national registration as the international registration would have
62. Id. at paragraph 905.
63. Id. at paragraph 460; Article 6(3) of the Agreement reads: The protection
resulting from the international registration.. .may no longer be invoked... if,
within five years from the date of the international registration, the national
mark.. no longer enjoys.. legal protection in [the country of origin].
Article 6(3) of the Protocol lists the specific circumstances under which an
international registration will be cancelled.
64. See Diplomatic Conference, supra note 22, at paragraph 471.
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become independent of the national registration; (2) if the
application had been rejected within the five-year period and was
subject to an appeal that would be completed after the period had
expired, an ultimate rejection of the application would result in the
cancellation of the international registration as the domestic
procedure had begun before the expiry of the five-year period;65
finally, (3) even if an initial decision had not been rendered within
the five-year period, the mark would still be vulnerable to central
attack as long as the opposition process had begun before the
expiration of that period.
The Federal Republic of Germany believed that the specific
language of 6(3) was necessary to cover all of these situations,
which occurred to varying degrees depending on a particular
Contracting Party's system.66 Ultimately, the language of Article
6(3) was adopted with a qualifying clause added to subparagraph
(iii), which requires that an application can only be withdrawn if it
is the subject of one of the enumerated proceedings, i.e., one begun
before the expiration of the five-year dependency period.67
A third highly debated provision was Article 9quinquies, which
allows for the transformation of a cancelled international
registration into several national registrations. One issue was
whether transformation would only be available if the basic
registration were cancelled upon request by the Country of
Origin's national office or whether transformation would be
available if that registration were cancelled for other reasons, such
as an applicant's withdrawal of his own application. Spain's
proposed version of 9quinquies provided that transformation
would be available both where the Office of Origin had requested
the cancellation of the international registration and where the
international registration has been cancelled "for any other
'6
reason. 8
The delegation from the European Communities objected to this
65. Id.. at paragraph 479.
66. d at paragraph 525.
67. Id. at paragraph 525.
68. Id. at Draft of the Protocol as Presented to the Diplomatic Conference,
Article 9quinquies.
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language as it felt transformation should be limited to cases of
successful central attack.69 The Federal Republic of Germany
objected to this language as well, stating that transformation
should not be available if, for example, an applicant, upon seeing
that his basic application was about to be cancelled, withdrew that
application in order to apply to individual countries for separate
registrations."
Ultimately, the majority of the delegations
supported removal of the language proposed by Spain in order to
clarify exactly when transformation would be available to an
applicant.7'
Another issue was whether a transformed international
registration would result in national applications or national
registrations.72 The delegations of the Federal Republic of
Germany as well as the Director General of WIPO confirmed that
the only obligation that National Offices had under Article
9quinquies was to accept the date of international registration as
the priority date for the national application; if it wished to go
further and accept this date as a date of registration, it could, but
was not obligated, to do so.73
Note that the three most intensely discussed issues - length of
the examination period, dependency of the international
registration on the basic registration, and transformation of a
cancelled international registration into national applications were resolved with an eye toward maintaining a balance between
an efficient registration process and a frame work that could
accommodate different registration systems (which would
maintain the sovereign integrity of those systems' users). Note
further that the creation of that balance does not call for the
harmonization of the laws of the different member states, but the
internationalization of the environment in which those laws exist.
A look at the deliberations of the Council of the European
69. See Diplomatic Conference supra note 22, at paragraph 763.

70. Id. at paragraph 769.
71. Id. at paragraph 786.

72. Id. at paragraph 802.
73. Id. at paragraphs 804, 816 (Statement of the Federal Republic of
Germany) and 816 (Statement of the Director General of WIPO).
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Community and the United States Congress and business
community shows that prospective members of the Union saw this
74
internationalization as a prerequisite to their joining the Protocol.
Even though the EU is not a member of the Madrid Union, it is
useful to look the Council's deliberations as it represents a major
governing body with its own system of trademark registration and
protection: the Community Trade Mark ("CTM"). 75 Further, it
may yet become a member of the Union, as is permitted by under
Article 14(b) of the Protocol. 76 The European Commission, in
emphasizing that the Madrid Protocol and the CTM were, in fact,
complementary, was actually alluding to two larger points: first,
the Protocol would not compromise the integrity of the system as
the Protocol is a standardized procedure for the international
registration of a mark while the CTM is a regional system for the
substantive protection of a mark.77 Consequently, international
applications designating the EU will be examined in the same way
as an application from one of the EU's members, i.e., the integrity
of its system would not be compromised.78 Second, as a result of
74. The statements excerpted here from members of the U.S. government and
business community were made before the U.S. acceded to the Protocol.
75. See Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the
Community Trademark, at http://oami.eu.int [hereinafter CTM Regulation]. For
a discussion of the Community Trademark, see Marshall A. Leaffer, The New
World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1

(1998).
76. Article 14(1)(b) Of the Protocol states:
.any intergovernmental organization may also become a party to this Protocol
where the following conditions are fulfilled
(i)
at least one of the member states of that organization is a party to
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property;
(ii)
that organization has a regional office for the purposes of
registering marks with the effect in the territory of the
organization...;
77. See Proposal for a Council Decision approving the accession of the
European Community to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Parl. Eur. Doc. (COM
96/0367 final-CNS 96/0190) (1996), availableat http://oami.eu.int.
78. See Proposalfora CouncilRegulation modifying Council Regulation No.
40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the community trademark to give effect to the
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this complementary nature, joining the Protocol would increase a
CTM holder's ability to obtain protection in different countries,
thereby increasing that holder's ability to compete in the
international marketplace. 9 In other words, that holder would be
privy to a level of administrative efficiency which would benefit
both him as an individual and the CTM system as a whole.
Both the U.S. government and American businesses were also
interested in this balance. More importantly, both believed, as does
the European Council, that the Protocol successfully achieves that
balance by creating an efficient administrative framework that
does not substantively alter domestic trademark law. Senators
Leahy and Hatch, both members of the Senate Judiciary
committee, repeatedly emphasized this point." Senator Hatch has
further underscored this argument by noting that foreign trademark
owners who wish to designate the U.S. in their Madrid

accession of the European Community to the Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks adopted at
Madrid on 27 June 1989, Pan. Eur. Doc. (COM 96/0372 final-CNS 0198)
(1996).
79. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on: the Proposalfor
a Council Decision approving the accession of the European Community to the
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the international
registration of marks, adopted at Madrid on 27 June, 1989 and Proposalfor a
Council Regulation modifying Council Regulation No. 40/94 of 20 December
1993 on the Community trademark to give effect to the accession of the
European Community to the protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement
concerning the international registration of marks adopted at Madrid on 27
June 1989, 1997 OJ (C 89) par. 2.11.
80. See Statement of Senator Leahy on Senate Judiciary Committee Mark-Up
of S. 671, The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, February 10, 2000;
Hearings Statement on the Madrid Protocol Implementation Act at the Senate
Judiciary Committee, July 19, 2001, available at http://leahy.senate.gov; The
Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Senate, June 14, 2002, (statement of
Senator Patrick Leahy), available at http://thomas.loc.gov; Statement of Orrin
G. Hatch Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Executive Business Meeting on
the Markup of S.407 - The Madrid ProtocolImplementation Act, July 19, 2001,
available at http://hatch.senate.gov; see also Statement of the Office of
Management and Budget, H.R. 741 - Madrid Protocol Implementation Act
(Rep. Coble (R) and 2 cosponsors), at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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applications will have to meet the substantive requirements of U.S.
trademark law in order to gain protection there. This will help to
ensure that American trademark owners are not disadvantaged by
the United States Patent and Trademark Organization's
("USPTO's") stringent requirements for registration. 8'
The USPTO also expressed its support for the Protocol. USPTO
Director James Rogan emphasized the benefit of "one-stop
shopping" (i.e. the ability to register a mark in many countries via
a single application) that the Protocol will provide for U.S.
trademark owners. He also pointed out that the Protocol will cut
costs for the applicant by allowing him to register for a single set
of fees rather than paying multiple sets of fees for multiple
registrations in various countries.82
Even before the Protocol went into effect and the voting
controversy referred to above was resolved, the Administration
recognized that the Protocol provides a balanced system.83 In
1995, Philip Hampton, the Assistant Commissioner for
Trademarks remarked that accession to the Protocol could open up
international opportunities to those who are currently unable to
afford broad international protection.84 He justified this conclusion
by citing the same reason that Director Rogan would cite six years
81. See Statement of Orrin G. Hatch Before the Senate Judiciary Committee
Executive Business Meeting on the Markup of S.407- The Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act (July 19, 2001), id; see discussion in Part IV.
82. See "PTO Chief Hopes Congress Will Wrap Up Madrid Protocol
Ratification, Implementation," supra note 3.
83. The Administration's position remained essentially unchanged. See
Prepared Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, President, Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Commissioner, Patents and Trademarks, Hearings on the Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act and Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act,
before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary, May 22, 1997; "PTO Chief Hopes
Congress Will Wrap Up Madrid Protocol Ratification, Implementation," supra
at note 15.
84. See Statement of Philp G. Hampton II, Assistant Commissioner for
Trademarks on H.R. 1270 "The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act" and H.R.
1295 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act" before the Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, United States
House of Representatives, July 19, 1995, availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
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later: namely, that a U.S. applicant filing under the Protocol would
be able to file in any number of member countries by filing a
single application in English and paying one set of fees.
Additionally, the applicant would be able to effect renewal or
assignment of the mark via a single application and a single set of
fees.85
At the same time, Rogan noted that implementation of the
Protocol would have no substantive effect on U.S. trademark law.
Hampton emphasized, as Senator Hatch subsequently would, that
under the Protocol, the U.S. would be able to maintain unaltered
its domestic registration system.86 More specifically, under the
Protocol, a foreign mark owner who requests an extension of
protection to the United States must submit an affidavit of a bona
fide intention to use the mark in commerce. If granted protection,
he then must file periodic statements and specimens of use in order
to maintain that protection.87
The International Trademark Association ('INTA"), an
organization which represents American businesses,88 always
championed the Protocol's ability to save trademark owners time
and expense, particularly for small and medium-sized business
owners.89 INTA both lobbied the administration and mobilized its
members to write their Senators and ask them to both ratify the

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Under the Protocol implementing legislation, owners requesting
protection in the United States are subjected to substantially the same
requirements to which foreign applicants are subject under § 1126. These are not
the same requirements to which domestic applicants are subject under §1051.
See discussion infra Part IV E.
88. See Washington Update, supra note 17.
89. See Summary of Testimony of the International Trademark Association
on H.R. 1295 and H.R. 1270, before the Committee on the Judiciary,

Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, United States House of
Representatives, July 19, 1995; See also Prepared Statement of David Stimson,
President, International Trademark Association, Hearings on the Madrid
Protocol Implementation Act and Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act,

before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary, May 22, 1997.
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Protocol and pass its implementing legislation.9" It emphasized
that any disadvantages the Protocol has (such as increasing the
PTO's workload) are far outweighed by the principal advantage it
provides for American businesses, which is to streamline the
international application and registration process.9' Moreover, the
only other alternatives are to register in each individual country,
which can be prohibitively expensive, or to forego protection in
particular jurisdictions and risk being subject to piracy, which is of
course unacceptable.92
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACCESSION TO THE PROTOCOL

Certain commentators argue that the Protocol does not
effectively balance the need for an efficient international
administrative system with the need to respect national laws. Two
authors argue that because of the differences in various countries'
legal systems, the Protocol's framework will actually be
detrimental to many U.S. trademark owners.93 One reason for this
is the relative difficulty in registering a trademark in the U.S., as
opposed to in a civil law jurisdiction (such as most of the countries
of the EU). In the U.S., an applicant's mark cannot be registered
unless the applicant demonstrates use of that mark in commerce."
An owner may submit an application stating their intent to use the
mark in commerce ("ITU"). In this case, the applicant will be
issued a notice of allowance, which gives then a priority date, and
will have to begin use of the mark within six months of that
issuance. But only after they submit evidence of use and the mark

90. See Washington Update supra note 17.
91. See The Madrid System for the InternationalRegistration of Marks, at
www.inta.org/downloads/tapmadridsys2000.pdf. See also A Short Primer on
the Madrid Protocolfor U.S. Trademark Owners and Counsel, available at

www.inta.org/policy/madridprimer.shtml.
92. See Guerra, supra note 4, at 526.
93. See Baila H. Celedonia & Jeffrey H. Epstein, Limitations of the Madrid
Protocolfor U.S. Companies, 387 PLI/Pat 257.
94. See 15 USC §§ 1051(a)(1), (2).
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is reexamined in light of that evidence can it be registered.95 In the
civil law countries of the European Union,96 an applicant does not
have to demonstrate use before registration. Rather, the mark is
examined by the national office independent of what it is or will be
used for. If the mark is subsequently registered, the registrant will
have, with minor variation across jurisdictions, five years to begin
use of the mark. This allows applicants in civil law countries to
more easily obtain and maintain basic registrations."
Another reason for this argument is the specification of goods
required by different countries. In the U.S. the mark may only be
registered for those goods or services for which the mark has been
used or for which there is a bonafide intent to use it. In many civil
law countries, such as France and Germany, a mark may be
registered for multiple, broad classes of goods without evidence of
use or intent-to-use.98 Under the Protocol, an applicant can
designate for his mark only the class of goods allowed by his
country of origin. According to one author, this restriction,
combined with differences in registration requirement could
amount to a serious limitation for American applicants.99 Yet a
third reason is the necessity of retaining local counsel. Although
ostensibly, an applicant under the Protocol does not have to retain
local counsel, a local agent will be better able to advise an
applicant on the suitability and availability of a mark in a given
jurisdiction."'
Carlo Cotrone finds a more fundamental problem with the
Protocol's structure. He rightfully states that the harmonization of
trademark law, that is, a system where trademark law across every

95. Id. at §§ 105 1(c), (d).
96. 1 have chosen to examine the general civil law model utilized in most of
the European Union as it varies little from country to country and contrasts
greatly with the U.S. common law model.

97. See ETHAN HORWITZ, WORLD TRADEMARK

LAW AND

PRACTICE (MATTHEW BENDER ed., 2 nd ed. 2002); see Celedonia, supra
note 89; see discussion infra Part IVB.
98. See Horwitz at Germany § 1.04, France § 1.04; Cotrone, supra note 21.
99. See Celedonia, supra note 93, at 263-65.

100. Id. at 273.
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He
jurisdiction is made substantially the same, is not possible.'
also rightfully states that the objective of an international system
should not be the harmonization of laws, as such, but the
"internationalization" of national laws. That is, an international
system should strive to create a framework where national bodies
of law can work in concert but remain (at least substantially)
uncompromised.102
However, he finds that the Protocol does not effectively create
this framework. As noted above, an international registration is
dependent on the basic registration for the first five years of the
international registrations' existence. If the basic registration
ceases to exist before that period expires (either because of a
successful central attack, or for any of the other reasons
enumerated in Article 6(3)), the international registration will be
cancelled as well." 3 Further, the scope of protection is limited to
that granted by the registrant's home country."° This dependency,
in Cotrone's view, divests a Contracting Party of its sovereignty as
it effectively subjects the registration in one country to the grounds
for cancellation in another. Further, the protection it grants a mark
is dictated by limits imposed by the Country of Origin.0 5 It also
violates the principle of national treatment as it prevents foreign
0 6
registrants from obtaining the protection given local registrants.
Thus, in Cotrone's view, by placing limits on the protection that
a mark holder can obtain, the Protocol actually makes individual
national registrations that much more attractive." 7 He argues that
instead of imposing the limits that it does, the Protocol should
allow the applicant to claim the full scope of protection offered by
each individual country. In this way, not only would each country
be able to extend protection to a mark as it saw fit, but would be

101. See Cotrone, supra note 29; see infra discussion in Part V.
102. See Cotrone at 98-99.

103. See discussion in Part I, supra.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Celedonia, supra note 93.
See Cotrone, supra note 29 at 100.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 102.
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able to cancel a mark on grounds it chose to provide.'0
The Protocol does treat applicants differently depending on
where they are from and which countries they designate for
protection. Also, it does, to a certain extent, favor the law of the
Country of Origin over that of a Designated Party. And while this
may be seen as a disadvantage to an international applicant and an
inequitable treatment of a country's legal system, one must keep in
mind the balance the Protocol strives to achieve. On the one hand,
it must create an efficient system of administration in order to
serve mark owners. But, on the other hand, it cannot create this
efficiency at the expense of the integrity of a Contracting Party's
legal system. Rather, it must allow various systems to exist side
The Protocol
by side without substantial modification.
accomplishes these goals in the best way possible.
IV. THE PROTOCOL AND THE BALANCE IT CREATES

A. The American Common Law Trademark System
That it does so can best be seen by examining the American
common law trademark system, the civil law trademark system as
it exists in most of the European Union,"°9 and how the Protocol's
framework accounts for their differences. First, the American
system: under that system, an applicant must file based on his use0
of the mark or intention to use the mark in commerce ("ITU")."1
If the applicant files based on an ITU, he must submit evidence of

108. Id. at 102-03.
109. The overview of the civil law system that I will present here is the
general model shared by most of the countries of the European Union (all of
them except Great Britain and Ireland) and the EU itself. See Horwitz, supra
note 97.
110. See 15 USC §§ 1051(a), (b). "Use in commerce" is defined as use of
the mark on goods that are sold or shipped across state lines, i.e., in commerce
which "may lawfully be regulated by Congress." See McCarthy on Trademarks
(4 th ed. 2002), §19:123; 15 USC §1127.
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use within six months of the issuance of the notice of allowance."'
Upon that submission, the mark will be re-examined.112 The Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") will not deny any mark registration
on the Principal Register unless it consists of immoral, deceptive,
or otherwise disparaging matter,'13 consists of a national insignia,"4
utilizes an individual's name, portrait or signature without his
written consent," 5 consists of a mark which is confusingly similar
to a mark already registered with the PTO" 6 or consists of a mark
which is merely descriptive or misdescriptive.117
If the Office does not deem the mark registerable, the applicant
will have six months to reply or amend his application. This
process will be repeated until the examiner finally refuses the
mark's registration or the applicant fails to respond within a given
six-month period." 8 If the mark is deemed registerable, it will be
published in the Official Gazette for opposition by third parties." 9
A third party will then have thirty days to oppose the mark. It may
do so on any grounds, 2 ° including likelihood of confusion,121
dilution,'22 unfair competition,' 23 and cybersquatting.124 If the mark
111. See 15USC§ 1051(d)(1).

112. Id.
113. See id §1052(a). § 1051 defines the Principal Register.
114. See id. § 1052 (b).
115. See 15USC§ 1052(c).
116. See id. § 1052(d).
117. See id. § 1052(e).
118. See 15 USC § 1062(b). This process applies to registrations sought on
the Principal Register. See 15 USC § 1052. An applicant may also apply for
registration on the Supplemental Register. See 15 USC §§ 1091 - 1095. I do
not discuss the Supplemental Register in this section as it is not directly relevant
to my analysis: marks registered on it have a status inferior to those on the
Principal Register. Further, marks on the Supplemental Register do not have a
right of priority as do marks on the Principal Register. See §§ 1057(c), 1094.
Consequently, marks on the Supplemental Register must survive attacks by
owners of marks with such a right before they can come within the purview of
the Protocol.
119. See 15 USC 1062(a).
120. See id. § 1063(a).
121. See id.§ 1114.
122. See id. § 1125(c).
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is not successfully opposed, it will be placed on the Principal
Register and a certificate of registration will issue.'25
In addition to other reasons, even if the mark is placed on the
Principal Register, a third party may still bring a petition to cancel
the mark on the same grounds, provided it does so within five
years from date of the mark's registration.'26 If there is no adverse
decision or there is no action pending against the registrant at the
end of that period, and an affidavit is filed with the Office per
§1065(3), the mark will become incontestable.'27 But even at this
point, a third party can challenge the mark on grounds including
prior-obtained rights, abandonment of the mark, and a fraudulently
obtained right of incontestability.'28
B. The Civil Law Trademark System
The general civil law model for trademark registration used by
most of the countries of the EU as well as by the EU's own
government is quite different from the American model. First, a
distinction must be made between absolute and relative grounds
for refusal of registration.
Generally, absolute grounds for
refusing registration exist when the subject of that registration is
descriptive, is a geographic indicator, is a person's surname, is
functional, or consists of scandalous or immoral material.'29
Relative grounds for refusal, as the name implies, are grounds for
123. See id. § I125(a)(1)(A)
124. Seeid. § 1125(d).

125. See 15 USC § 1063(b)(1).
126. See 15 USC §1064(1).
127. See id. at §1065(1), (2).
128. See id. at §1115 (b).

129. Absolute grounds are similar to those grounds upon which an American
examiner may refuse an application. See 15 USC §§1052 (a), (b), (c) and (d).
See, for example, German Law on the Protection of Trademarks and Other
Signs, Law No. 89/104/EEC, Section 8; Spanish Law 32/1988, of November 10,
1998 on Trademarks, Section 24(2), The Trade Marks Act of Denmark, Law
No. 162 (21/02/1997), CTM Regulation, Article 7. The CTM Regulation is
available at http://oami/eu/int. All other European legislation referred to here
and subsequently is available at http://clea.wipo.int.
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refusal based on the conflict between an applied-for mark and a
mark that is already registered. 3 '
Generally, a trademark office will first examine the mark on a
combination of absolute and relative grounds as well as for
compliance with formalities. For example, in Germany and
Portugal, the respective trademark offices will examine the mark
primarily on absolute grounds and for compliance with
administrative formalities."' But, the German trademark office
will also reject an application on the relative ground that the mark
is confusingly similar to one that is already registered and/or wellknown in Germany.'32 The Spanish trademark office, on the other
hand, looks almost exclusively at whether the applicant has
complied with statutory formalities.'33
If the mark survives the examination process, it is published for
third-party opposition. 34 That party usually has a short amount of
time to file the opposition.'35 Grounds for opposition can vary
greatly from country to country. In Germany, only a proprietor of
an earlier-filed, earlier-registered, or earlier well-known mark may
oppose a newly published mark.'36 In Spain, a wider variety of
parties may oppose a mark - an opposition may be brought by "an
interested party who considers himself prejudiced" by the potential
130. See German Law, supra note 129, at section 9; Industrial Property Code
of Portugal, Law No. 16 (24/01/1995), Art 33(1).
131. See German Law, supra note 129, at section 37; EU Regulation, supra
note 129, at Article 8; Industrial Property Code of Portugal, supra note 130, at
Articles 188 and 189.
132. See German Law, supra note 129, at Sections 9 and 10.
133. See Spanish Law, supra note 129, at Sections 16-24.
134. See, for example, France, Decree on Trademarks and Service Marks,
(as
No. 92-100, section 8; Austria, Trademark Protection Act of 1970
amended), Law No. 109 (1993), Section 17 (4), (5); See Horwitz, supra note 97,
at Sweden §2.01.
135. For example, In Spain, France, and Sweden, the third party has two
months to file an opposition. See Spanish Law, supra note 129, at section 26(2),
French Law, supra note 134, at section 8, Horwitz, supra note 97, at Sweden
§2.01; In Germany, the third party has three months to file an opposition. See
German Law, supra note 129. In Greece, the third party has about 4 1/2 months.
See Trademark Law of Greece, No. 2239 (9/16/94), Article 10(4).
136. See German Law, supra note 129, at Section 42(2).
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registration.'3 7 The Benelux countries (Belgium, The Netherlands
and Luxembourg) have a similar provision.'3 8 Even if a mark
survives an opposition, it may still be cancelled.
The grounds for cancellation are more or less consistent from
country to country. In Germany, either the trademark office or a
third party may have the registration cancelled on absolute
grounds.'39 Greece has a similar provision. 4 ' In France and in
Spain, a mark may be cancelled by the respective trademark
offices on absolute grounds or by a third party on relative
grounds. 4 ' There is less consistency across the EU with regard to
incontestability: in France, an action based on an infringement of
rights or a breach of contractual or legal obligations can only be
brought for three years after publication. 4 2 In Spain, if an action is
not brought against the mark within five years of publication, it
becomes generally incontestable.'4 3 In Germany, for a period of
five years from registration, a third party may bring an action
based on prior rights in a mark.'
However, a mark never
becomes incontestable.'
In Portugal, a third party must bring a
cancellation action within ten years of a mark's registration in
order to avoid "prejudice" to his rights.'46
With minor variation, a mark will be cancelled in all civil law
137. See Spanish Law, supra note 129, at Section 26(1).
138. See Benelux Convention Concerning Trademarks (2/12/1992), Article
14A.
139. See German Law, supra note 129.
140. See Trademark Law of Greece, supra note 135, at Article 1017(l)(a-e).
141. See Horwitz, supra note 97, at France § 6.04; Spanish Law, supra at
note 129, Sections 47(1) and 48(1). See also the law of Finland, which, in
contrast to most European jurisdictions, allows an opposition or cancellation
motion on the same grounds (prior use in Finland, prior use of a famous mark
outside of Finland, copyright, industrial design, use of a tradename, genericness
or descriptiveness), see Horwitz, supra note 97, at Finland, Chapter 5:
Oppositions and Cancellations.
142. See Horwitz, supra note 97, at France § 4.03.
143. See Spanish Law, supra note 129, at section 48(2).
144. See German Law, supra note 129, at sections 51(1), (2).
145. See Horwitz, supra note 85 at Germany §4.03.
146. See Industrial Property Code of Portugal, supra at note 117, at Article
214(5).
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jurisdictions of the EU if the mark is not used within five years of
registration. In Spain, for example, if the mark is not used in this
period, a third party may bring an action for the cancellation of the
mark and it is up to the proprietor to show that the mark has, in
fact, been used in connection with goods and services.' 47
However, the mark will not be cancelled if, during the period
between the end of the five-year use period and three months prior
to the bringing of that action, the proprietor engages in bona fide
use of the mark.' 48
Assuming successful registration, this means that an owner can
refrain completely from using the mark in commerce for more than
five years.'49 This differs markedly from American practice, which
requires either a demonstration of use or a rapid initiation of use
by the domestic applicant before an application will be considered
Further, not requiring a proprietor to
for registration. 5 °
demonstrate use fundamentally alters the grounds on which a mark
can be attacked at various points of the registration process. In the
American system, a third party can, at multiple points, oppose a
mark based on the various ways it is used to sell goods or services.
In the civil law system, the same grounds are theoretically
available even though the mark is not in use. However, they are,

147. See Spanish Law, supra note 116 at section 53(a).
148. Id. Other countries in the EU have similar practices. See Horwitz, supra
note 85 at Italy §6.05, Finland, Chapter 5: Oppositions and Cancellations; The
Trademarks Act of Denmark sections, supra note 116 at sections 25, 28(3);
Austia, Trademark Protection Act of 1970, supra note 121 at section 33a.
149. The registration process also does not require evidence of use or intent
to use-at most, the applicant only needs to indicate what the goods the mark
will be used for. See, Jbr example, French Law, supra at note 121, at section
3(c); Trade Marks Act of Denmark, supra a note 116, at Section 12(1); Horwitz,
supra note 85 at Italy §1.05, ; Portugal, for example, does require that a mark
holder file a declaration of an intent to use the mark, but this is required six
months before the first five-year period ends, (and the mark becomes generally
incontestable), not before the initial registration of the mark, as is required,
under certain circumstances, in America; see Industrial Code of Portugal, supra
note 117 at Article 195, see discussion in section IV, A, supra.
150. 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(b).
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by definition, much more difficult to employ before use begins.'
Consequently, the elimination of the need to immediately
demonstrate use of a mark in commerce makes it easier for a
maintain the registration of a mark in a
proprietor to obtain and
2
5

civil law jurisdiction. 1

For some, the fact that the Protocol does not immediately allow
an American applicant to take full advantage of this system with
respect to the countries that use that system undermines the
efficiency and equity the Protocol is designed to create.' 53 But as
will be shown below, the Protocol does not undermine efficiency
and equity. Rather, the framework it creates is informed by a
particular approach chosen specifically to achieve those two goals.
This approach is particularly appropriate as it both allows for the
sought-after compromise documented in Part II and best
accommodates the differences, illustrated above, between the
American common law system and the civil law system.
C. The Protocol'sFramework
There are essentially two approaches the Protocol's drafters
could have taken in achieving that compromise, i.e., the creation of
a system that allows for efficient international registration but
minimizes encroachment on national legal regimes. The approach
not taken by the Protocol would protect the integrity of the
Contracting Parties' legal systems by substantially vitiating some
of the requirements of the Country of Origin's system. This
approach, briefly explored above in Part 11, would necessitate two
principal changes to the Protocol's framework: (1) rather than
restricting the mark to the goods classifications allowed by the
country of origin, the Protocol would allow the registrant to
151. Confusion and dilution are based on whether a mark's use conflicts with
that of a prior-registered mark. In a civil law system, where no use is required
for five years, these grounds are, by definition, much more difficult for third
party who wishes to oppose a mark to employ. See discussion in Parts IV, A and
B, supra.
152. See Horwitz, supra note 97; see Celedonia, supra note 93.
153. See Cotrone, supra note 29.
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designate classes of goods that are as broad or as narrow as is
allowed by the Contracting Parties in whose jurisdictions
protection is sought; 54 (2) the dependency requirement of Article
6(3) of the Protocol would be replaced by a mechanism that allows
a mark to be cancelled in a particular Contracting Party's
jurisdiction only on the grounds provided for in that jurisdiction. 55
By this approach, a Contracting Party's legal system would be left
fully intact while the applicant may fully enjoy any advantages
1
that system provides.

56

Conversely, the second approach, which is employed by the
Protocol, incorporates both the class restrictions imposed by the
Country of Origin and a dependency scheme. The superiority of
this approach is best illustrated by more closely examining the
Protocol's registration timeline. First, the international application
is submitted to the national Office, which then forwards it to the
International Bureau. The Bureau then examines the application
for conformity with formal requirements set out in the Common
Regulations.'57 If the Bureau finds that the mark conforms to those
requirements, it will register the mark in the International Register,
notify both the Office of Origin and the designated Contracting
Parties, send a certificate to the holder, and publish the mark in its
Gazette.158
The Contracting Parties will then have the period of time
prescribed under Article 5(1) and (2) of the Protocol to examine
the mark. Under both the American system and civil law systems,
a mark may be opposed and cancelled, on different grounds, of
course, even after it is registered. With regard to the dependency
requirement of Article 6 of the Protocol, the international
registration will be cancelled if the basic registration is cancelled
due to central attack or ceases to exist for any other reason within
154. See Celedonia, supra note 93, at 265; see Cotrone, supra note 29, at
100.
155. See Cotrone, supra note 29, at 102.

156. Id. at 102-03.
157. See Protocol Regulations, supra note 34, at Rule 9, Requirements
Concerning the International Application.
158. Id. at Rule 14(1), Rule 32(1)(a)(i).
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five years of the international registration's issuance.'59 But if the
mark survives that five-year period, upon that period's expiry, the
international registration becomes independent of the basic
registration 6 ° and the registrant can take advantage of the goods
classifications allowed by each individual country.'61
D. The Two Systems Under the Protocol
The dependency requirement of Article 6 is an integral part of
the Protocol's framework. Suppose a proprietor obtains a U.S.
registration in 2003 (which will become incontestable in the U.S.
in 2008). 162 He then submits his international application to the
PTO, which forwards the application to the Bureau. After an
examination for compliance with formalities, the Bureau forwards
the registration to the designated Contracting Parties for
examination.' 63
Note that, assuming that the process is
successfully completed, the period of dependency, which lasts five
years, coincides directly with the five years it takes for a mark to
become incontestable in the American system, i.e., at the same
time the national registration becomes incontestable, the
international registration will become independent of that national
(basic) registration."6 See Fig. 1.

159. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6(3).

160. Id. at art. 6(2).
161. Author's e-mail exchange with the USPTO (on file with author).
162. 15 USC § 33(b).
163. The hypotheticals assume negligible delay between the time the
applicant obtains his basic registration, the time that basic registration is
forwarded to the bureau, and the time the bureau forwards the international
registration to the offices of the designated Contracting Parties.

164. See Protocol, supra note 1, at Article 6(2); an American registration will
become incontestable after five years. 15 USC §§ 1065 and 1115 provide
defenses to a claim of incontestability, but those defenses are limited compared

to what is available before the five-year period expires.
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Fig 1: International Registration Based on a U.S. Registration
Period of Dependency
2003

2008

Basic Registration obtained,
International Registration obtained,
Designated Parties Notified

Period of Dependency Ends

All Lanham Act grounds for cancellation
of U.S. registration available
Ift
w

2003
U.S. Registration (Basic Registration)
obtained; International
Registration obtained

2008
Mark becomes
incontestable in the U.S.

That these two periods coincide is particularly important if a
third party in the U.S. can successfully show that the registrant's
U.S. registration should be cancelled. In the above scenario, that
third party will have five years to commence a cancellation
proceeding, the result of which will potentially be the cancellation
of both the basic and international registrations.165 This potential
outcome is equitable as a registrant should not be able to claim
international protection based on an invalid basic (i.e., domestic)
registration. Further, it does not compromise the Contracting
Parties' systems of protection, for those Parties may transform a
proprietor's cancelled international registrations into national
applications or registrations and use the date of the international
registration as a priority date.'66 In other words, the designated
countries may continue to provide protection for the mark if they

165. See Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 6(3).
166. The proprietor must file the national applications within three months in
order to claim that priority date. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 9.
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see fit to do so.
The Protocol's system actually provides the U.S. applicant with
an advantage if he bases his international registration on a basic
application rather than a basic registration: assuming a
successfully completed 18-month examination period in the U.S.
(rounded to two years for purposes of this discussion), the
registration, if applied for in 2003 and obtained in 2005, will
become incontestable in 2010. However, the Protocol's five-year
period of dependency will have begun in 2003 and ended in 2008.
Consequently, there will be two years in which a third party has all
statutory methods of attack open to him but will not, even if
successful in having the national registration cancelled, be able to
have the international registration cancelled. Of course, shortening
the examination period brings the Protocol's dependency period
more closely into line with the five-year period before
incontestability, which renders the mark even more susceptible to
attack; lengthening the period of time has the opposite effect.'6 7
See Fig. 2.
Fig 2: International Registration Based on a U.S. Application
Period of Dependency under Protocol
p
p
2008
2003
Period of Dependency Ends
Basic Application obtained,
International Registration obtained,
Designated Parties Notified

167. In fiscal year 2001, the average pendency of a trademark application in

the USPTO was 17.8 months. The goal in fiscal year 2002 was to reduce that
period to 15.5 months. The actual pendency in 2002 was 19.9 months. Much of
this delay was due to the need to complete examinations pending from previous
years before new applications could be dealt with. The PTO is continuing to
implement its electronic filing system and other measures to reduce the
pendency period. (The PTO's fiscal year runs from October I to September 3 1).
See 2002 Performance and Accountability Report, 32 -34,

available at

www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual.
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2008
Dependency
Period ends

2010
U.S. registration
becomes
incontestable

2005

2010
Period during which all Lanham Act grounds for
cancellation of a U.S. registration available

The Protocol's system works to the advantage of the civil law
applicant as well: since a civil law jurisdiction registers marks
without requiring use, the examination period will be substantially
shorter.16
Assuming that the civil law registrant's international
registration is based on a basic registration from a civil law
country, the five-year use period employed in a civil law
jurisdiction will coincide exactly with the Protocol's five-year
dependency period.'69 She retains this advantage even if she
designates the U.S. in her international application: although she
must submit to the USPTO a statement of bona fide intent to use
the mark in commerce in order to gain an extension of protection
to the U.S., she will not have to begin use for five years from the
issuance of that extension; 7 ' while a U.S. proprietor may base his
168. Further evidence that the civil law jurisdictions of continental Europe
utilize a much shorter examination period is the membership of most of those
countries in the Madrid Agreement, which requires that examinations be
completed within twelve months. See Madrid Community Membership List,
supra note 60; see Agreement, supra note 2, at Article5(2).
169. Again, for the purposes of this discussion, I have assumed negligible
delay between the time the office in a civil law jurisdiction grants a registration,
transmits it to the International Bureau, and the Bureau grants the International
Registration.
170. This requirement is consistent with the way foreign marks are already
treated under § 1126 of the Lanham Act and is already reflected in the Protocol
implementing legislation. Minor adjustment to the statutory language is needed
to make this explicit. See infra discussion in Section IV E.
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application on a statement of bona fide intent-to-use, he cannot
obtain a registration without, among other things, submitting
evidence of actual use and then having his mark re-examined in
light of that use.' See Fig. 3
Fig. 3: International Registration
registration

based

on

civil

law

Dependency Period under Protocol
2003
Basic Registration obtained,

2008
Period of Dependency Ends

International Registration obtained,
Designated Parties Notified
Period during which all grounds for
cancellation in civil law jurisdiction are available

2003
Registration obtained
from civil law jurisdiction
(Basic Registration)

2008
Grounds
available for
cancellation in civil law
jurisdiction are reduced

These three examples demonstrate that the Protocol, rather than
vitiating a Contracting Party's sovereignty, leaves the sovereignty
of both the Contracting Parties and the Country Of Origin
substantially uninfringed by respecting their different legal
models: it protects the American common law system by providing
a five-year period of dependency during all or most of which third
parties within the U.S.'s jurisdiction may bring action to cancel the
mark, as is their right under American trademark law. The civii
law system is also substantially maintained under the Protocol as
the dependency period coincides with the period during which a

171. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 114h(3), 1051(b).
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registrant may refrain from using the mark. This is true even if the
applicant designates the Unites States in their international
application. 72
'
This method of balancing the two systems is proper as an
applicant should not be able to base an international application on
an application or registration from his home country while being
given the means to circumvent its legal system via an application
or registration in a foreign jurisdiction. If the applicant wants to
avoid his country's legal system, he can file directly with a given
country's national office. The Protocol takes the correct approach
by giving the Country of Origin the initial prerogative to both
determine the scope of international protection, via the
classification of goods prescribed by that country, and by giving it
the initial prerogative to deny an applicant international protection.
It then shifts those determinations to the designated contracting
parties either via independence of the international registration five
years from the beginning of that registration's existence or via
transformation after the international registration is cancelled. To
strike this balance any other way would be to completely
subordinate one country's legal system to that of another.
The correctness of this approach also has to do with the different
registration requirements of both systems.
Any system of
international trademark registration must allow pre-use registration
to continue in all civil law jurisdictions. At the same time, a
common law jurisdiction such as the U.S. cannot be expected to
accept a treaty that does not respect its requirement of use before
registration. The Protocol accounts for both of these systems; it
does this by allowing civil law jurisdictions to continue pre-use
registration and by allowing the U.S. to implement the Protocol in
a way that is consistent with other provisions of the Lanham Act.
E. U.S. TrademarkLaw and the ProtocolImplementing
Legislation
The fundamental

premise

of U.S.

trademark

law

is the

172. See infra discussion in Part IV E.
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requirement that a mark owner demonstrate use of a mark in
commerce before being granted a registration.'73 The Lanham Act
modifies that requirement for with respect to the registration of
foreign marks. § 1126(e) provides that:
A mark duly registered in the country of origin of
the foreign applicant may be registered on the
principal register if eligible, otherwise on the
supplemental register in this act provided. Such
applicant

shall

submit... [a

statement

of]

the

applicant's bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce, but use in commerce shall not be
requiredprior to registration (emphasis added).
Assuming the mark meets the requirements of § 1052 and is not
opposed or withstands opposition, the registration will issue."
With regard to the use requirement for marks registered under §
1126, 1058(b) states in pertinent part:
During the 1-year period immediately preceding the
end of the applicable time period set forth in
subsection (a), 7 5 the owner of the registration shall

pay the prescribed fee and file in the Patent and
Trademark Office

-

(1) an affidavit setting forth those goods or services
recited in the registration on or in connection
with which the mark is in use in commerce...
(2) an affidavit setting forth those goods or services
recited in on or in connection with which the
mark is not in use in commerce and showing
173. See Port, supra note 9, at 38-39. Note that § 1052 of the Lanham Act
does not contain a use requirement.
174. See Lanham Act § 1063(b)(1).
175. The applicable time period is the first 6-year period following the date
of registration and each 10-year period following the date of registration. See §
1058(a)(1), (3).
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that any such nonuse is due to special
circumstances which excuse such nonuse and is
not due to any intention to abandon the mark.
Under the Lanham Act, a foreign mark, assuming it is either
unopposed or successfully withstands an opposition, 76 can be
registered without a demonstration of use and a statement of use is
not required until five years after the registration is granted. 177 In
other words, the U.S. treats that mark almost exactly as does a civil
law jurisdiction.
An examination of the Protocol implementing legislation
demonstrates its consistency with this structure: in close parallel to
§ 1126(e), §1 141f(a)(1) requires that a request for an extension of
protection include a statement of bonafide intent to use the mark:
A request for extension of protection of an
to
the
United
international
registration
States.. .shall be deemed to be properly filed in the
United States if such a request, when received by
the International Bureau, has attached to it a
declaration of bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce...
§ 1 141h(a)(1) provides for publication of the mark upon successful
examination:
A request for extension of protection described in [§
l141f(a)] shall be examined as an application for
registration on the Principal Register... and if on
such examination it appears that the applicant is
entitled to the extension of protection under this
title, the Director shall cause the mark to be
published in the Official Gazette...

176. See Lanham Act § 1063.
177. See infra discussion in Part IV B.
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§ 1141h(a)(2) provides a third party with the opportunity to
oppose the mark within thirty days of that publication. 78
Assuming the mark is not opposed or withstands opposition, the
extension of protection will issue.'79 A key distinction, however,
between extension of protection under § 1141 and registration
under § 1126 is that under § 1141, a mark not registerable on the
Principal Register will be refused an extension of protection; it
cannot gain that protection via registration on the Supplemental
Register. 8 ' Under § 1126, a mark may be registered on either the
Principal or Supplemental register. 8' In this way, seeking an
extension of protection under § 1141 can be riskier that applying
for registration under § 1126.
The use requirement outlined in § 1058 can already be read to
apply to § 1141 extensions of protection just as it does to § 1126
registrations: the 6-year use period applies to all registrations
"issued pursuant to the provisions of [the Lanham Act]." A slight
modification to the language of § 1058 or to the Code of Federal
Regulations will make its relationship to § 1141 more explicit by
clearly stating that this period applies to both registrations and
extensions of protection issued pursuant to the provisions of the
Lanham Act.1 2 The foregoing analysis shows that the Protocol is
178. This section is analogous to §§ 1063(a) and (b). Subsection (b)(l)
provides that marks successfully registered under § 1126 shall be published for
opposition. Subsection (a) gives a third party thirty days after publication to
bring that opposition.
179. See § 1141i(a).
180. See § 1141h(a)(4).
181. See § 1126(e).
182. The PTO's proposed rules of practice regarding the Protocol implement
a similar modification. See Rules of Practice In Filings Pursuant To The Madrid
Protocol, 68 Fed Reg. 15,137 (2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 7). §
7.36(b) of the proposed rules states, in pertinent part:
During the following time periods, the holder of an international registration
must file an affidavit or declaration of use or excusable nonuse, or the registered
extension of protection will be cancelled:
On or after the fifth anniversary and no later than the sixth anniversary after the
date of registration ....
(2) Within the six-month period preceding the end of each ten-year period after
the date of registration, or the three month grace period immediately
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entirely compatible with existing U.S. legislation. What follows is
a discussion of why the registration processes under §§ 1126 and
1141 and the process to which domestic U.S. applications are
subjected can coexist under the Lanham Act, how that
compatibility informs the Protocol's general structure, and how
that structure serves as a voluntary model for the
internationalization of trademark law.

V. A "VOLUNTARY" MODEL FOR THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
TRADEMARK LAW

A. Substance vs. Procedure
We can begin by asking a general question. A way to pose that
question is to ask whether countries who seek to harmonize their
laws procedurally can really do so without also harmonizing those
laws substantively. But asking the question in this way ignores the
fact that substantive and procedural provisions can never be
entirely separated: in terms of trademark law, the substantive
criteria by which a trademark application is examined, and by
which a registration is maintained, largely determine the
procedural framework in which that application and registration
exist. To illustrate, if a civil law jurisdiction had the substantive
requirement that an applicant demonstrate use of the mark in
commerce before successful registration, then the process of
registration would necessarily be altered - at the very least, there
would be some type of pre-registration examination process,
making the registration of a mark take longer. Consequently, it
would look much more like the American common law system.
Similarly, a change in procedure will inevitably require some
change in substance.
Section 1126(e) of the Lanham Act
illustrates this point: as has been explored above, a foreign
registration under that section is not subject to the same procedure

following...
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as is a domestic application under § 1051. In fact, the registration
process under § 1126(e) looks more like the civil law model
described in Part IV than the U.S. common law model. The reason
is that in order for the U.S.'s system to accommodate an expanded
set of participants, it was adjusted to fit a process that the common
law model did not originally contemplate. The adjustment entailed
the incorporation of a process more like that administered in many
foreign applicants' countries of origin. The incorporation of this
new procedure brought about an alteration in the requirement of
use before registration - the substance of the common law model.
Since one cannot completely separate procedure and substance,
a better way to frame the question is ask whether the different
systems of trademark protection can coexist within the same
international procedural framework while still remaining
substantively separate, albeit with certain characteristics in
common. The answer is yes, as long as that framework leaves
intact each member state's exclusive jurisdiction over its own
territory and the permanent population living there.'83 The Lanham
Act illustrates how this can be done: even though the requirements
of § 1126 are quite different from those to which a U.S. applicant
is subject under § 1051,84 the two can coexist under the Lanham
8 5
Act because they apply to two discrete sets of applicants.
The language of § 1058 aside, the requirements of §1141 can
coexist with those of § 1051 for the exact same reason. § 1141e(b)
states that:
Where the United States Patent and Trademark
Office is the office of origin for a trademark
application or registration, any international
registration based on such application or registration
cannot be used to obtain the benefits of the Madrid
Protocol in the United States.

183. See Brownlie, supra note 23.
184. See 15 USC §§ 1051(a)(1), (b)(1), and (d)(1).
185. 15 USC § I126(b) restricts the application process defined in § 1126 to
non-U.S. applicants.
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The language cited above makes clear that the only applicants
who can obtain the benefits of the Protocol in the United States are
those whose country of origin is not the United States, i.e., foreign
applicants. Just as with § 1126, the requirements of § 1141 apply to
a set of applicants entirely discrete from that to which the
requirements of § 1051 apply. In this way, the U.S. retains control
over its own citizens. That the Protocol's structure allows for this
manner of implementation makes it a model for trademark
internationalization as each member state retains the domestic
control so crucial to its sovereignty." 6
B. A Voluntary Model for the Internationalizationof Trademark
Law
The U.S. Congress has made certain changes to the procedural
and substantive rights to which U.S. applicants and registrants are
subject under the Lanham Act. Three recently-passed provisions
of the Lanham Act are the provision for the ITU, discussed above
in parts IV A and E, the Federal Dilution Statute, embodied in
§ 1125(c) of the Lanham Act, and the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, embodied in § 1125(d) of the Lanham
Act. 8' Port contends that these provisions unjustifiably bring U.S.
trademark law substantively closer to the civil law model by
granting U.S. applicants and registrants rights in a mark that are
not based on the use of that mark in commerce. "'
Port may be right - the provisions he discusses may indicate the
186. See Brownlie, supra note 23.
187. § 1125(c) allows an owner to enjoin another person's commercial use of
a trademark if that use is found to "[cause] dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark." § 1125(d) allows an owner to enjoin the use of a domain name that
consists of his mark if the registrant registers that domain name in bad faith. For
a full discussion of these provisions, the ITU provision, and their impact on U.S.
trademark law, see Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev

(2000).
188. See Port, supra note 187. (Port believes that these provisions were
passed in contravention of the social, economic and legal justifications that
underlie American trademark law).
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movement of U.S. trademark law toward a civil law model.
Further, this movement may be unjustified.'89
But whatever the actual effect of these provisions on the U.S.
model, and whatever Congress's motives for passing them, their
passage has no bearing on the Protocol's success as a model for
the internationalization of trademark law, as the passage of these
or like provisions is not required for participation in the Protocol's
system. Further, they are not necessary for the Protocol to work.'90
Under the Protocol, a contracting party's introduction of new
provisions into its domestic system is that party's prerogative. The
maintenance of this prerogative is what makes the Protocol a
viable model for the "voluntary" internationalization of trademark
law. That is, a contracting party may voluntarily make its laws
more like those of the other Contracting Parties. Alternatively, it
may choose not to. Either way, the Protocol's framework, and a
Contracting Party's ability to participate in that framework, will be
unaffected.
It has been argued that the Community Trademark ("CTM"),
which provides a framework for trademark registration in the
European Union, contains the legal principles on which a global
trademark system could be based.' 9' It has also been argued that

189. Whether the U.S.'s movement toward a civil law model is as drastic as
Port believes is questionable. First, as Port points out, Congress never indicated
a desire to harmonize U.S. law with the civil law model when passing these
measures; at best, its motives were ambiguous. Second, while these provisions
do provide rights that had not existed previously, U.S. applicants still must
demonstrate use in order to register a mark and maintain that registration.
Third, whatever changes these provisions created, the American common law
and civil law models of trademark protection are still very different.
190. Along with the Protocol, the Trademark Law Treaty, which places a
limit on the number of formalities that each country may impose on an
applicant, creates part of the framework for international trademark law. For a
discussion of the Trademark Law Treaty, see Marshall A. Leaffer, The New
World Of International TrademarkLaw, 2 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 18-23.
The Text of the Trademark Law Treaty is available at www.wipo.int.
191. See Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of
Trademark Law: The Community Trademark as a Model of Unitary
TransnationalTrademark Protection, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

43

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAUL J. ART. &ENT. LAW

[Vol. XIII: 17

that the CTM can serve as a model for eventual substantive
harmonization of national trademark laws.'92 While the CTM is an
impressive system, it cannot serve as a model for either
internationalization or eventual substantive harmonization of
different trademark systems. This is true for two reasons: first, the
CTM shares the general civil law registration model that is
employed by all but two of the EU member states; for most
members, the CTM represents, at most, a minimal departure from
their own systems.'93 While the CTM demonstrates that it is
possible for the civil law system to accommodate the common law
system, it is doubtful that common law nations outside the EU
would consent to being subordinated to that system. 94 Second, the
CTM creates a substantive trademark right intended to exist
alongside the right given by each EU member state.'95 As the
author explains, this substantive right was intended to closely
parallel the substantive rights already granted by most of those
"'
But again, most of those member states are civil law
states. 96
jurisdictions. Consequently, it is possible for the CTM to grant a
substantive right that is the same as, or similar to, that granted by
those member states. However, as illustrated above in Part IV, the
American common law system of trademark protection and the
general civil law model differ greatly, granting different
substantive rights at different points in the registration process.'97
It is highly unlikely that the U.S. (or, for that matter, any other
common law state) would ever accede to a global system that
grants a civil-type substantive right that exists in parallel to its
own.
The Protocol, on the other hand, provides a viable model for the
internationalization of trademark law for two reasons: (1) its
system of international registration only consists of an examination
for compliance with formalities; it leaves substantive examination
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Blakely, at 348 -349.
CTM Regulation, supra note 75.
Blakely, supra note 19, at 347.
id. at 338, 346-347.
id. at 339.
discussion in Part IV.
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of the mark to the Country of Origin and the Contracting Parties;
(2) in contrast the CTM, it confers no post-registration substantive
right; rather, it leaves the granting of the substantive rights to the
Country of Origin and then, after the five-year dependency period
expires, shifts that prerogative to the designated Contracting
Parties. In this way, the Protocol is minimally invasive of the
Contracting Parties' own systems. On a broader level, the
contracting parties maintain their sovereignty as they can change
their respective legislation as they see fit without compromising
their ability to participate in the Madrid system and without
affecting that system's ability to function. This balance between
individual sovereignty and administrative efficiency is what makes
the Protocol a viable model for the future of international
trademark law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Protocol creates an environment that allows different
systems of trademark law to coexist. First, it allows a contracting
party to join the Protocol with little or no modification to its own
laws. Second, the Protocol properly gives the Country of Origin
the initial prerogative to provide a mark with substantive
protection and shifts that prerogative to the Designated Parties
after an appropriate period. Finally, an individual Contracting
Party may alter its own laws as it sees fit without affecting its
ability to participate in the Protocol's system or compromising that
system's ability to function. These provisions ensure that the
sovereignty of the individual Contracting Parties is left intact even
while their individual trademark systems are brought under one
administrative framework.
For the U.S., this translates into access for American trademark
owners to global protection via a system that does not compromise
the U.S.'s jurisdiction over its own territory. On a global level, the
Protocol provides a truly viable model for the internationalization
of trademark law. As a member of the Protocol, the U.S. should
work with WIPO, the other Contracting Parties, and others who
are not yet members of the Protocol (especially countries who

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

45

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAULJ.ART &ENT. LAW

[Vol. XIII: 17

have a common law legal system) to develop a better picture of
what the interaction between the Protocol and different domestic
trademark systems actually looks like.' 98 This picture will help
WIPO improve the Protocol's framework and strengthen the
balance between national sovereignty and international
administrative efficiency that it creates.

198. England, Australia, and the U.S. are the only members of the Protocol
who use the common law system. England joined on December 1, 1995, while
Australia joined July 11, 2001. More time is needed to properly observe the
interaction of the common law and civil law systems within the Protocol's
framework before any conclusions can properly be drawn. See Madrid
Community membership list, available at www.wipo.org. One matter worthy of
investigation is the impact on U.S. mark owners of foreign registrants' being
able to register in the U.S. without first having to demonstrate use of a mark in
commerce. While this already takes place under § 1126(e) of the Lanham Act,
under the Protocol, it will occur on a much larger scale.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss1/3

46

